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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffAppellant,

Case No. 20040685-CA

vs.
ABIGAIL FLORES GONZALES,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUPPLEMENTATION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal not only under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), as provided in the State's opening brief, but also under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (West 2004), providing for a State's appeal from "afinaljudgment
of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a refusal to bind the
defendant over for trial[.]"

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
DEFENDANT CONCEDES THAT THE TRIAL COURT RELIED
ON RULE 9-301 WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE OF THE ISSUE TO
THE PARTIES
After hearing testimony from both justice court judges who presided over
defendant's previous DUI convictions, the district court judge in this case issued a written
ruling in which he found that "the State has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant waived his right to counsel in both proceedings before the two Justice
Court Judges" (R. 148). He then determined that one of the justice court judges had
complied with the requirement of rule 9-301, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, of
providing a written advisory of rights and enhancement possibilities to defendant (R. 14849). The other justice court judge, he ruled, had provided at least a verbal advisory (R.
149). Despite these warnings, however, the judge ruled that there was no evidence that
defendant had signed any written advisory pursuant to rule 9-301 (id). Accordingly, the
judge dismissed the enhanced DUI charge (id).
In his statement of the case, defendant acknowledges that the trial judge raised the
issue of rule 9-301 "sua spon[]te[,Y and notes that he "was surprised with the ruling by
the trial court and his reliance on Rule 9-3PL and did not anticipate said ruling." Aplee.
Br. at 2 (emphasis in original). This acknowledgment support's the State's argument at
subsection B of its opening brief that the trial judge's decision was rendered on an issue
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neither raised nor argued by the parties without notice or an opportunity for either party to
provide any input. Aplt. Br. at 10-21. Relevant input was available in light of the fact
that the ruling: 1) subverted the unrebutted presumption of regularity to which the State
was entitled and which was acknowledged by the trial court; 2) placed the trial judge in
the role of advocate for defendant; 3) disregarded this Court's decision in State v.
Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, \ 21, n.9, 81 P.3d 775, cert denied, 87 P.3d 1163 (Utah
Feb. 18, 2004), and cert, denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah Mar. 1, 2004); and 4) foreclosed the
prosecutor from adducing evidence on point, which evidence clearly existed but was not
presented as it was not relevant to the arguments raised and addressed by the parties
below. See Aplt. Br. at 10-21. The trial court's action amounts to an abuse of discretion
and warrants reversal and remand for further proceedings.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS FOR AFFIRMANCE OF THE
DISMISSAL ON ALTERNATIVE BASES ARE CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED LAW
Defendant makes no argument in defense of the trial court's reliance on Rule 9301. Instead, he seeks affirmance of the trial court's ruling on an alternative ground: a
conviction in justice court cannot be used to enhance a subsequent offense because a
justice court is, by definition, a court of no record. Aplee. Br. at 1. To support his
position, defendant presents several arguments, all of which were presented to and
rejected by the trial judge:
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A) the statute contains ambiguous language which defendant claims cannot
reasonably be interpreted to permit the use of convictions which occurred
prior to July 1, 2001, to enhance any conviction which occurs subsequent to
the effective date of the 2001 amendment (id. at 2-3, 9-11)1;
B) the statute provides inadequate notice to defendant of the enhancement
possibility, in violation of his due process rights, where, in comparison with
past versions of the statute, there is no previous provision involving "the
resurrection of old DUI convictions" for use in enhancing the most recent
charge (id. at 4);
C) the state constitution and state statutes identify justice courts as courts
"not of record," trumping any statutory requirement that any record be
generated in the justice court (id. at 11-13); and
D) the absence of a record leads to no meaningful oversight or
accountability of proceedings in the justice court, which proceedings are
suspect following the consolidation of the courts which imposed on justice
court judges additional responsibilities for more complicated matters
previously handled by law-trained magistrates in circuit courts (id. at 5-7,
13-17).
(R. 11-40, 48-52, 83-84, 102-23, 127-35, 148-51).
Defendant's arguments fail in the face of the appellate record herein and
established law.

defendant mistakenly asserts that the 2001 amendment to the DUI statute became
effective July 1, 2001. Aplee. Br. at 2. However, this Court in Marshall accurately noted
that the effective date of the 2001 amendment was April 30, 2001. See Marshall, 2003
UTApp 381, If 6, n.l.
4
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A.

This Court Has Previously Interpreted The Plain Language Of The 2001 DUI
Amendment In A Manner Contrary To Defendant's Claim
Defendant claims that the statutory language is ambiguous and does not permit the

use of convictions entered prior to July 1, 2001, to enhance convictions occurring
subsequent to the effective date of the 2001 amendment. Aplee. Br. at 2-3, 9-11.
The 2001 DUI amendment at issue provides:
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony
if it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten
years of two or more prior convictions; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that
is committed after July 1, 2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section that is
committed after July 1, 2001.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp. 2001). Defendant argues that subsection (ii)(B),
which addresses prior felony violations, necessarily refers to subsection (i), which
addresses prior convictions generally. Aplee. Br. at 9-11. Read together, he argues, the
sections limit the enhancement use of prior convictions to those convictions occurring
after July 1, 2001. Id. From defendant's point of view, no rational reading of the statute
would permit convictions occurring prior to July 1, 2001, to be used to enhance any DUI
violation occurring after the effective date of the 2001 amendment. Id. at 11.
First, subsection (i) is separated from subsection (ii) by means of the disjunctive
"or," signifying that they represent separate means of enhancing a DUI charge to a third
degree felony. See State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah App.1995) (holding that the
5
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disjunctive term "or" between terms in a statute "delineates alternative ways a defendant
triggers the [statute]"). Grafting the date found in subsection (ii)(B) onto subsection (i)
ignores the structure of the section and fails to give the statute its plain meaning. Instead,
the plain language of subsection (i) provides that a third DUI conviction occurring on or
after the effective date of the statute is a third degree felony if committed within ten years
of two prior DUI convictions, regardless of when those prior convictions occurred. See
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i).
Further, this Court responded to a similar argument interpreting the 2001 DUI
amendment in State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,81 P.3d 775. There, Marshall argued
that the 2001 amendment violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws
because it took into account offenses committed before its enactment for purposes of
enhancement. Id, at ^ 13 & n.3. This Court rejected the argument, noting that the Utah
Supreme Court had upheld the habitual criminal statute against this same argument. Id. at
ffif 15-16; see also Zeimer v. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 232, 381 P.2d 721, 723-24 (1963)
(rejecting the defendant's claim that his conviction under a 1951 version of the habitual
criminal statute was illegal because it took into account an offense that occurred before its
enactment).
Defendant offers nothing more to support his argument in this case and fails to
distinguish this case from Marshall Where defendant's argument fails to reflect the plain
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language of the statute, and he offers no further support for his interpretation of the
statute, his claim of ambiguity is without merit.2
B.

Defendant Establishes No Due Process Violation
Defendant claims generally that the 2001 DUI amendment provides

constitutionally inadequate notice of an enhancement possibility because nothing in prior
versions of the statute warned him of the possibility of resurrection of old DUI
convictions for use in enhancing future charges. Aplee. Br. at 4.
This Court in Marshall ruled that proper application of the 2001 amendment does
not violate a defendant's constitutional due process right. 2003 UT App 381, ^f 17-23. It
is not an ex post facto law, and it provides adequate and timely notice of its application to
offenses committed on or after its effective date. Id. at \ 16-17 & n.7. An accused is
deemed to be on notice of the 2001 amendment and the legal consequences thereof as of
its effective date of April 30, 2001. Id. at \ 18. Where defendant's enhanced DUI
occurred on September 2, 2002, he had more than sixteen months' notice of the
enhancement possibility presented by the statute before committing the offense which
gave rise to this matter (R. 1-2).

2

Defendant also summarily asserts that the 2001 amended statute "is being applied
retroactively" in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (West 2004), which provides that
"No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." See Aplee.
Br. at 3. However, this Court rejected this argument in Marshall See 2003 UT App 381,
<[j 16, n.6 ("The 2001 amendment does not operate retroactively; therefore, it comports
with section 68-3-3.").
7
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To the extent defendant contends that he had insufficient notice at the time of the
previous pleas that they may be used in the future to enhance a subsequent offense, this
argument is equally without merit. First, defendant establishes no constitutional
entitlement to notice of such a collateral consequence. See Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,
If 23.
Second, the trial court found that defendant in fact received such notice at the time
of the prior convictions. The judge found that "[b]oth the presumption of regularity and
the evidence preponderates" in favor of the determination that both justice court judges
expressly advised the defendant at the time of sentencing on the prior matters "that
subsequent convictions could be used to enhance the penalties which might be imposed in
the event that similar cha[r]ges were incurred in the future" (R. 150-51). The dismissal in
this case was based instead on the absence of anything showing defendant's signature on
a written version of the same notice (R. 148-49). Hence, even assuming a constitutional
entitlement to the notice, defendant's receipt of actual notice defeats his claim.
Third, this Court rejected the argument in Marshall, relying on the United States
Supreme Court's rejection of a similar argument in Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994). See Marshall, 2003 UT App. 381, If 19. Nichols had argued
that constitutional "due process requires a misdemeanor defendant to be warned that his
conviction might be used for enhancement purposes should the defendant later be
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convicted of another crime." Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument, stating:
No such requirement was suggested in Scott [v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.
Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979)], and we believe with good reason. In the
first place, a large number of misdemeanor convictions take place in police
or justice courts which are not courts of record. Without a drastic change in
the procedures of these courts, there would be no way to memorialize any
such warning. Nor is it at all clear exactly how expansive the warning
would have to be; would a Georgia court have to warn the defendant about
permutations and commutations of recidivist statutes in 49 other States, as
well as the criminal history provision of the Sentencing Guidelines
applicable in federal courts? And a warning at the completely general
level—that if he is brought back into court on another criminal charge, a
defendant such as Nichols will be treated more harshly—would merely tell
him what he must surely already know.
Id. Accord Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, ^f 19, n.8 (citing other state decisions following
the statements in Nichols and rejecting similar due process claims). Accordingly,
defendant's due process argument fails.
C.

Proceedings In A "Court of No Record" Are Not Inherently Suspect But Are
Entitled To The Presumption Of Regularity
Defendant's remaining arguments focus on the fact that the justice court is

essentially a court of no record.3 He contends that a court of no record, by definition,

3

The Utah Constitution permits the establishment by statute of courts not of record
and prohibits any requirement that judges of such courts be admitted to practice law. See
Utah Const, art. VIII, §§ 1, 11. Justice courts are established and detailed in Title 78,
Chapter 5 of the Utah Code. By statute, the justice court generates a minimum of
paperwork, including an abstract, a written judgment, a docket containing specific entries,
a docket index, and any paper necessary to complete the matters before the court. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-5-117, 118, 119, -121, -122, -123, and -125 (West 2004). There
is, however, no detailed record kept of the specifics of each event which occurs in a given
9
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cannot generate any record with which a subsequent conviction may be enhanced. Aplee.
Br. at 11-13. He implies that all justice court proceedings are suspect, arguing that, in
light of the recent consolidation and reorganization of the lower courts in this State, any
record generated in such a court is not sufficiently reliable to establish the "whole truth"
of what occurred where there is no accountability or meaningful oversight of the
proceedings. Id. at 5-7, 11-17.
These arguments fail in light of this Court's decision in State v. Ferguson, 2005
UT App 144, 111 P.3d 820.4 Ferguson was charged with a third degree felony based on
his prior misdemeanor conviction for violation of a protective order. Id. at ^ 2. The
lower court granted Ferguson's motion to quash the bindover on enhancement of the
protective order violation, which left the charge as a class A misdemeanor, and the State
sought an interlocutory appeal. Id. at ^f 3.
On appeal, Ferguson claimed, in part, that the State bore the burden of establishing
whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in the prior plea
proceeding before using the prior conviction to enhance the subsequent charge to a third
degree felony. Id. atfflf20, 22. Neither party produced for use in the appeal a copy of the

justice court, as occurs in courts of record, and pleadings need not be written. See
McMillan v. Forsythe, 47 Utah 571, 154 P. 959, 961 (1915).
4

This Court's decision in Ferguson issued one month after the State's opening
brief was filed in this matter. Ferguson is currently before the Utah Supreme Court on
certiorari review of the question of whether a prior uncounseled guilty plea may enhance
a subsequent charge. See State v. Von Ferguson, Case No. 20050376-SC.
10
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transcript of the prior plea hearing, and Ferguson argued that the silence of the record
concerning whether he had waived his right to counsel, together with the certified copy of
the prior misdemeanor conviction showing that he had appeared pro se at the plea
hearing, prevented any presumption of regularity from arising. Id. atfflf22-23, 27, n.3.
In rejecting Ferguson's argument, this Court took the position that "'just because a
record [of prior convictions] was unavailable, its unavailability alone could not be used to
show noncompliance [in the prior proceedings] with well-established constitutional
requirements."' Ferguson, 2005 UT App 144, f 27 (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,
31, 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992)). In Parke, the United States Supreme Court determined that
there was "no good reason to suspend the presumption of regularity" in a case in which
"no transcripts or other records of the earlier plea colloquies existfed] at all." 506 U.S. at
30. "[I]t defies logic to presume from the mere unavailability of a transcript (assuming no
allegation that the unavailability is due to governmental misconduct) that the defendant
was not advised of his rights." Id.
As in Parke, this Court found that the presumption of regularity still attached in
the face of a "silent" record, and Ferguson was required to "produce a transcript,
testimony regarding taking of the plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative evidence" in
order to effectively rebut the presumption [of regularity]." Ferguson, 2005 UT App 144,
ffif 30-31 (quoting State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, Tf 11, 68 P.3d 1035).
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Ferguson controls here. The absence of a formal verbatim record of the
proceedings surrounding defendant's prior justice court pleas does not "suspend the
presumption of regularity," raise the specter of suspicion regarding the earlier
proceedings, or otherwise prevent the use of those pleas to enhance his most recent DUI
conviction. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 29-31; Ferguson, 2005 UT App 144,127. Upon the
State's production of the certified records of his prior guilty pleas, the presumption of
regularity arose, placing on defendant the burden to adduce some evidence that the pleas
were involuntary. See Ferguson, 2005 UT App 144, f 27; Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, ^j
7. The same limited record available to the State was also available to the defendant, and
he establishes no error in that information. He had ample opportunity to produce
affirmative evidence to rebut the presumption, but his efforts were unsuccessful.
Further, defendant's generalized concern for the overall ability of justice court
judges to fully and fairly conduct the proceedings before them in light of the recent
reorganization of the lower courts and their responsibilities does not establish that there is
any reason to believe that he did not enjoy his constitutional rights in either of his
previous justice court cases at issue herein. To the contrary, the testimony of both justice
court judges in this case satisfied the lower court that there was no violation of
defendant's constitutional right to counsel, as he had claimed (R. 148-49).

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Accordingly, defendant's claim that the dismissal below may be affirmed on the
alternative basis that the prior convictions arose from courts of no record is without merit.
CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the lower court's order
dismissing the felony charge against defendant and remand the matter to be bound over to
the district court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ j d a y of September, 2005.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

[S C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of
Appellant were mailed first-class, postage pre-paid, to Margret Sidwell Taylor, attorney
for defendant/appellee, 20 South Main Street, Helper, Utah 84401, this Q^y^day of
September, 2005.

14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

